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Different Country, Same Questions

October 21, 2011 by

One of the biggest recent successes of the NCAA is that the message is finally getting across that there is no such thing as “The NCAA”. There is an organization headquartered in Indianapolis with those initials. But when it comes to how college athletics is regulated and controlled, the national office is just one part of a larger network that is populated largely by member schools but which also includes conferences and coaches associations.

Now that the NCAA has convinced many to zoom in and take a closer look at the actual structure of college athletics, the next goal for the NCAA should be to convince the public to zoom out and look at the NCAA as simply one part of an even larger system. That system, messy at its best and corrupt at its worse, is the one that takes millions of children from their first experience playing sports and eventually produces a few hundred or few thousand world class athletes.

Plans for significant NCAA reform generally make two assumptions. First, that college athletics should continue as the primary method for developing professional or Olympic athletes. And second, that the effect of changes in college athletics on youth athletics can or should be ignored. The result is that many reform plans are like engineers tasked with making a car go faster, but only by focusing on the engine, not the entire vehicle.

College athletics, as currently constructed, has a lot of advantages. It broadens the talent base. It requires athletes to make progress toward a career as a non-athlete. It funds a high level of coaching and support for many athletes through university subsidies and fan interest that is unrivaled in what is ultimately a U–23 youth league.

It has its drawbacks though. Mixing class and practice limits the amount of time athletes can train. Those large subsidies come at a time when many universities are strapped for cash. Scholastic and intercollegiate sports are almost universally tied to a system of amateurism as well.

Because the NCAA is often viewed as representative of all athletic development in the US, a lot of the failings of our development system are attributed to our peculiar attachment to high-level sports run by schools and the traditional attachment to amateurism that has come along with it. But across the pond they’re struggling with the same issues.

The Football League has agreed to adopt the Elite Player Performance Plan, which was developed by the Premier League (they are actually separate entities). The plan takes the current two designations of youth football teams (Academy and Centre of Excellence) and breaks it into four levels. Level 1 will require a budget of at least £ 2.5 million and 18 full-time staff members. In exchange for that investment, clubs have no limits on the time young players can spend in training (currently limited to 3–5 hours per week) and no limit on where players can come from (currently limited to within a 60–90 minute commute from the training ground).

That comes along with a standardized compensation system when youth players move to new clubs, with much lower initial payments and higher payments if the player becomes a productive professional for the first team.

The plan was initially met with a furious reaction from the smaller clubs, who described a parade of horribles that should sound familiar to college sports fans. Bigger clubs would gobble up all the young players, either by scouring the country for schoolboys or poaching players from the smaller clubs on the cheap. Getting passed over by a big club early would be more harmful to a youngster’s pro prospects, so the fear is agents will become prevalent for nine and ten year-olds. And a valuable source of income for some teams will go away as it will be much harder to be a feeder club, one that develops good young pros, then selling them to the richer teams.

The questions are the same in England and the US. Where should potential pros get the bulk of their playing time? Should talent be widely distributed or concentrated in a few large organizations? Is playing for a local team in meaningful games better for development that the advantages that the big boys can provide? What is the appropriate time for young athletes to start thinking about agents and contracts, salary and bonuses?

All those questions need to be asked here directly instead of through coming up with ideas about how the NCAA should operate. The NCAA is just one piece of the puzzle in the career of an elite athlete. It is time to think about that whole career and the NCAA’s place in it. Or at the very least to think about how changes to the NCAA affect the rest of that path.

The opinions expressed on this blog are the author’s and the author’s alone, and are not endorsed by the NCAA or any NCAA member institution or conference. This blog is not a substitute for a compliance office.

About John Infante

The opinions expressed on this blog are the author’s and the author’s alone, and are not endorsed by the NCAA or any NCAA member institution or conference. This blog is not a substitute for a compliance office. If you’re a coach, do not attempt to contact the author looking for a second opinion. If you’re a parent, don’t attempt to contact the author looking for a first opinion. Compliance professionals are by their nature helpful people generally dedicated to getting to the truth. Coaches should have a bit of faith in their own, and parents should talk to one directly.

Filed Under: Bylaw Blog, Feature Tagged With: , ,

NCPA Presents Good Question, Hints At More Radical Change

September 14, 2011 by

The struggle over whether to pay college athletes is relatively simple. Or at least, it is compared to the struggle over what to pay college athletes. Proposals to allow a greater degree of compensation to college athletes are a dime a dozen and it is easy to find objections to a specific proposal. This is actually a positive. It means the NCAA is getting enough right that it is hard to change and please a substantial majority of people.

The recently released study by the National College Players Association and Drexel University’s Department of Sports Management is one of the most detailed and well-executed pay-for-play proposals in recent memory. It offers a detailed plan that addresses multiple issues. It offers a plan to see these reforms turned into actual change. And it offers no shortage of data in support of the proposal.

However, the NCPA paints a very different vision for Division I athletics that most college athletes, fans, and administrators are used to. In making a series of assumptions, the NCPA study embraces a cynicism that is hard to go along with even given the quality of the proposal and the data to support it. If the NCPA wants its proposal to be taken seriously by stakeholders in the NCAA and the rest of college athletics, it must address these issues.

Major League Pay in the Minor Leagues

One of the tried and true criticisms of the NCAA is that the association is operating minor leagues for the NFL and NBA, either through implict acceptance or outright conspiracy. Which is why I find it confusing that alternate revenue models default to collectively bargained revenue sharing agreements that are only common in the major leagues. I’ve covered this issue before, but if any pay-for-play system developed in college athletics, it seems more likely it would resemble minor league or developmental pay, rather than major league pay.

Calling a collectively bargained revenue split “the free market” is also something of a misnomer, especially when citing a number that was simply offered one side in a negotiation. A collective bargaining agreement restricts the free market in order to make it a more competitive market. In a free market, the Miami Heat might have paid the Big Three more and had a different and better compensated supporting cast.

Finally, the study does not address a very important exception to the NBA and NFL revenue splits. High school seniors–and in the NFL college freshmen and sophomores–are offered 0% of the revenue. No matter what the NCAA is offering, it is better than nothing. Absent evidence that the NCAA wanted this situation and helped bring it about, that discrepancy must be addressed before anointing the results of a CBA process as fairer than the NCAA legislative process where student-athletes do have a voice, whether you belief it is sufficient or not.

The True Value of Being a Student-Athlete

The NCPA study takes pains to focus the conversation on the immediate status of student-athletes. This prevents the pay-for-play debate from moving into the realm of the value of an education or the dollar figure that should be attached to instruction from coaches. It makes for a much simpler and more practical debate.

The study takes the value of room and board, essentially the living expenses provided to student-athletes, and measures it against the national poverty line. The study generally finds a full scholarship wanting. However, the study did not take into account the additional financial aid or benefits that are available to student-athletes, not counting the portion of the NCAA’s revenue distribution earmarked for student-athletes (that is a seperate issue).

In addition to room and board, student-athletes receive a number of other benefits. While institutions cannot provide clothing at their discretion, what is available to student-athletes for “practice or competition” is interpreted rather broadly. When a student-athlete is on the road or starting the night before a home game, meals can be provided. Not to mention that a full-grant in aid covers the academic year (typically 8–9 months) while the poverty line is based on the entire year and the other months (semester and summer break) can be covered by another source (vacation period expenses or summer aid).

On top of that, there is additional aid. Federal grants, state grants, scholarships, and need-based aid. All of this helps fill the gap between a full grant-in-aid and the cost of attendance. Admittedly, the best organization to undertake a comprehensive study of what full scholarship student-athletes are paying out of pocket taking into account this additional “income” is the NCAA. And while the NCAA should make that study a priority (and likely will given that the membership is currently debating this issue), that does not mean these sources of financial aid and basic necessities for student-athletes can be ignored.

The Cure Cannot Be As Bad As The Disease

One source of assistance for student-athletes in meeting the gap between the full grant-in-aid and cost of attendance is the Student Assistance Fund. The study is dismissive of the SAF, claiming it is an element of control over student-athletes.

It is entirely reasonable to say the SAF is not enough, and could not be enough no matter how well-funded. It is also reasonable to disagree with the SAF regulations, which allow the money to spent on student-athletes in ways other than providing direct benefits to individual athletes. It is even reasonable to suggest that institutions should direct more of the SAF money to revenue-sport athletes, although I vehemently disagree with that position.

It is not reasonable to not give the NCAA and its members credit for the SAF. If the scholarship gap is a practical problem, millions of dollars that can go to student-athletes to fill that gap cannot be discredited or worse vilified. It puts the NCAA in an impossible Catch–22. Provide the money and the NCAA is a “welfare state” using the money to control student-athletes. Don’t provide the money and the NCAA is hoarding revenue that student-athletes helped earn. Outside income is either a philosophical issue separate from the scholarship gap or the scholarship gap is not a practical student-athlete welfare issue. It cannot be both.

Defunding Non-Revenue Sports

I have to start by giving credit where credit is due. Most arguments for NCAA reform fail right off the bat because they have not considered basic questions about what college athletics should look like. How many schools should be in the top level of college athletics? How many sports should they sponsor? How many athletes should be competing on the same level for the same rewards?

The NCPA has thought about these questions. While it is not explicit, the focus on the scholarship gap suggests the NCPA does not mind a smaller Division I. While I may be reading too much into this and other NCPA studies, it seems reasonable to say the organization believes institutions in Division I should be able to fully finance their student-athlete’s educations. What is explicit is how many sports institutions should be sponsoring at the highest level, in this case men’s basketball, football, and just enough women’s sports to meet the school’s legal obligation under Title IX.

Saying institutions should only invest in non-revenue sports what is legally required or the bare minimum necessary to field a team is asking the NCAA and its members to embrace a cynical view of intercollegiate athletics. That college sports should be run as a profit-maximizing enterprise and under-performing business units shuttered or defunded.

That claim requires more than simply a statement that concludes non-revenue sports are lavish excesses. To justify taking money away from programs where coaches rarely make millions and where new money is often spent improving the student-athlete experience, you need an explanation of why only football and men’s basketball players deserve a well-funded, elite athletic experience.

Small Reforms, Massive Tweaks

The NCPA’s report is one of the better and more detailed studies of economic issues facing student-athletes. It has shortcomings but those do not detract from the larger point. Colleges could provide more to their student-athletes within the principles the NCAA has established. Of the reforms offered, the NCAA has committed to exploring all but two: deregulation of athletically related income and Congressional action (which if the current reform movement bears fruit would not be necessary).

As soon as non-revenue sports are presented as a source of funding for these reforms, this ceases to be about fixing one system and becomes a call for a new system. One where expanding opportunities for women, training Olympic athletes, and providing educational opportunities for more athletes is seen as a negative. It is no longer about holding the NCAA accountable for the association’s own mission. It is about fundamentally changing college athletics. When the two are confused, no honest or productive conversation about reform can occur.

The opinions expressed on this blog are the author’s and the author’s alone, and are not endorsed by the NCAA or any NCAA member institution or conference. This blog is not a substitute for a compliance office.

About John Infante

The opinions expressed on this blog are the author’s and the author’s alone, and are not endorsed by the NCAA or any NCAA member institution or conference. This blog is not a substitute for a compliance office. If you’re a coach, do not attempt to contact the author looking for a second opinion. If you’re a parent, don’t attempt to contact the author looking for a first opinion. Compliance professionals are by their nature helpful people generally dedicated to getting to the truth. Coaches should have a bit of faith in their own, and parents should talk to one directly.

Filed Under: Bylaw Blog, Feature Tagged With: , ,

Fixing the Basketball Draft Process

May 6, 2011 by

In the life of an elite athlete, from the beginning of a youth career until the end of a professional career, there are a number of transitions. There’s the transition from disorganized play to organized sports. There’s the transition from generalization to specialization. And there’s the obvious transition from high school athlete to college athlete.

Regulation of a stable period in an athlete’s career is relatively good. There are many unsettled issues, we don’t agree on everything, but there appears to be general agreement that the regulation is good enough that everyone involved should be expected to follow those rules. We also tend to agree on major trends: financial aid, for example, in the NCAA has experienced much more deregulation than increased regulation over the past few years. Academic eligibility, on the other hand, has seen the opposite.

Regulation of the transitions between periods in an athlete’s career are much more contenious and as a result, much more poorly regulated. NCAA recruiting rules are an example. In 2009, the SEC proposed preventing women’s soccer coaches from even accepting phone calls from juniors. In 2011, women’s soccer coaches will be able to initiate phone calls to juniors once a month.

Regulation of the transition from college athletics to the professional ranks has wandered just as much. After fairly consistently deregulating the professional transition, by allowing draft entry and tryouts financed by a professional team, two recent proposals in men’s basketball have increased regulation of the professional transition by moving the draft withdrawal deadline up to early April.

Another major reasons the transitions in an athlete’s life are so difficult to get a handle on is that one entity rarely has control over all the actors. When it comes to professional drafts, the NCAA can regulate the athletes, but not the teams. The NBA can regulate the teams, but not the players. Regulations can also counter or negate each other. The NBA has a withdrawal deadline of 10 days before the draft, but that is supersceded by the NCAA’s May 8 and upcoming early April deadlines.

The first step in any improvement of the NBA draft process is cooperation between the three entities involved: the NBA, the NCAA, and the NBPA. Cooperation has yielded huge benefits for athletes in MLS. For example, MLS held off intermingling professionals and youth amateurs until the NCAA adopted Proposal 2009-26. Now professionals, newly signed players out of high school, and amateur academy players are all mixing it up in the Reserve League.

If there is cooperation and compromise between the NCAA, NBA, and the players (through the NBPA), the NCAA’s job is relatively light. It would be to simply remove any bylaws that create a barrier to the agreed-upon system. What those rules are depends on the system, although you would expect that Bylaw 12.2.4.2.1.1 would at worst need to be removed and at best be obsolete. When coming up with any potential compromise solution, it’s important to recognize what each side wants out of the deal. College coaches want roster certainty as soon as possible, NBA teams want sufficient time to evaluate the player pool, and players want as much certainty in their draft status as possible.

Many have clamored for the NBA to adopt the “baseball” model, but have focused on MLB’s age limits, where high school graduates can be drafted, but if a prospect enrolls at a four-year college, they aren’t draft eligible for three years. The more critical difference between MLB and the NBA is that no one declares for the MLB draft. Everyone who meets the eligibility requirements is automatically placed into the player pool. This circumvents any NCAA rule prohibiting prospects or student-athletes from “declaring” for the draft. Thus baseball student-athletes are free to be drafted and attempt to negotiate a contract without jeopardizing their eligibility.

Another option is the NHL model. Unlike the MLB’s signing deadline, the NHL’s does not apply to athletes who enroll in college. All 18 year-olds are eligible for the draft. Many college hockey players are playing right now with their rights held by NHL teams. Each year they can attempt to negotiate a contract (up to the NHL’s rookie maximum) and then if they don’t like the offer, stay in school.

Both would have problems when applied to basketball. First, both drafts are big: seven rounds for the NHL and up to 50 rounds for MLB. This is to help support another distinguishing feature of MLB and the NHL: affiliated minor league teams. In addition to larger rosters than NBA teams, NHL teams provide most of the players for the AHL, while MLB teams stock a range of minor league teams at different levels. And while MLB has a slotting system and the NHL has a maximum rookie contract, neither have the strict rookie scale that the NBA employs.

So small rosters and limited draft picks means a draft player returning to college could be devestating to an NBA team. And a rookie scale means there’s no incentive to return to college for a drafted player. The result is that the NBA would have almost free reign to draft whoever they want, rather than who wants to be drafted or who thinks they cannot get a better deal down the road by staying in college.

A better solution is the model employed by MLS. No underclassman or high schooler can declare for the MLS SuperDraft. Anyone who has not exhausted their eligibility is entered into the draft one of two ways: either the league signs them to a Generation adidas contract or a team nominates them for the draft. Obviously an athlete who signs a Generation adidas contract cannot return to school because they’ve signed a professional agreement. MLS then promotes the drafting of the Generation adidas class by exempting the salary from the cap and the roster spot as well.

The NBA could create a similar system as part of a new CBA. After gathering info from teams and scouts, the NBA could offer a guaranteed contract to any underclassman that appears to be solidly in the first round. The contract might be guaranteed at a level equal to the end of the first round (average of $910,000 guaranteed for two years in 2011-2012) and would automatically increase to the draft slot if selected higher than there.

Should the player fall into the second round, the league eats the cost above the player’s draft slot and shoulders the guarantee. Other underclassman could be nominated, and drafted players who refuse to sign after a relatively short signing period would be released, put back into the pool next year, and the team given some sort of compensation (perhaps a salary cap exception to find another player for the roster spot).

How has this worked in MLS? On December 12 last year, Akron defeated Louisville. On December 18, just over two weeks later, Akron knew it was losing five starters from that team. Because of when signing dates fall, Akron coach Caleb Porter had a month and a half to respond before signing day.

The system benefits players by providing objective proof of draft worthy. All the promises in the world mean nothing if they aren’t backed up by an actual contract. The system benefits NBA teams by not requiring an athlete declare, but still signaling to teams who is definitely in or definitely out. It’s hard to feel sorry for a team who took a player who was not fully committed to the league when players who are were available. And if NBA teams moved away from drafting any player who hadn’t signed with the league already, coaches are assisted by being able to point to factual evidence that an athlete is unlikely to get drafted.

At some point, all the parties involved need to come to some sort of compromise rather than pretending that the actions of one don’t affect the others. There’s a significant amount of outcry against the NCAA’s latest move in this ongoing drama. There would be equal outcry at what would develop if the NBA were to trump the NCAA’s regulations by unilaterally changing its draft process. If you think the oversigning debate in football is vicious, it would be much worse in basketball. And as the NCAA will take the brunt of the criticism either way, it’s in the NCAA’s interest to start the dialog.

The opinions expressed on this blog are the author’s and the author’s alone, and are not endorsed by the NCAA or any NCAA member institution or conference. This blog is not a substitute for a compliance office.

About John Infante

The opinions expressed on this blog are the author’s and the author’s alone, and are not endorsed by the NCAA or any NCAA member institution or conference. This blog is not a substitute for a compliance office. If you’re a coach, do not attempt to contact the author looking for a second opinion. If you’re a parent, don’t attempt to contact the author looking for a first opinion. Compliance professionals are by their nature helpful people generally dedicated to getting to the truth. Coaches should have a bit of faith in their own, and parents should talk to one directly.

Filed Under: Bylaw Blog, Feature Tagged With: , ,

NCAA Rules That Could Have Been

April 18, 2011 by

The NCAA Division I Manual takes a lot of criticism for being a large and unwieldy beast full of esoteric and confusing rules. The size is a bit overstated, and much more complicated legal codes can be found. But the best way to defend what’s in the Manual is to point out what isn’t in the Manual.

Every year, about a hundred or so proposals are offered. Many tend to be adopted. And most are approved without much debate or controversy. But between the tendency of NCAA committees to go wherever the data points them and 31 conferences with their own ideas, sometimes proposals can go off the reservation. So here’s the 10 craziest NCAA rules of the last decade that never made it over the hump into the Manual.

#10: 2008-27

In women’s lacrosse, to specify that an institution’s athletics department staff member shall not arrange lodging for a prospective student-athlete on an unofficial visit in an enrolled student-athlete’s residence (e.g., dormitory room, apartment) until August 1 following the prospective student-athlete’s junior year in high school.

2008 began a series of innovative recruiting proposals that lead to a through review of the entire recruiting model that started in 2009 and continues to this day. Part of the impetus for that review was a series of proposals by the Ivy League in women’s lacrosse designed to test different recruiting reforms. The proposal even expressly stated that the concepts could be a pilot program in women’s lacrosse, then expanded to other sports.

The most specific among them was 2008-27, which sought to eliminate the unofficial official visit, where a junior prospect stays overnight, gets free tickets to games, but pays for her own food, transportation, and entertainment. All of the sport-specific legislation was defeated, although many of the concepts were combined in another proposal on the list the following year.

#9: 2010-76

In women’s basketball, to reduce the annual limit on the number of counters at each institution from 15 to 13.

The most recent proposal on the list, offered by the Metro Atlantic Athletic Conference, sought to reduce women’s basketball’s scholarships to the same level as men’s basketball.

The proposal is noteworthy for two reasons. First, it is the only reduction in financial aid for a sport that has been proposed since 2000. Even men’s sports have gotten proposals seeking to increasing scholarship limits. And secondly was the MAAC’s “use it or lose it” rationale, pointing out that the average number of women’s basketball scholarships used was 13.08.

#8: 2007-23-A

In tennis, to specify that, prior to full-time collegiate enrollment, an individual may accept prize money based on his or her place finish or performance in open athletics events, not to exceed $10,000 per calendar year; further, to specify that once the individual has reached the $10,000 limit, he or she may receive additional prize money on a per event basis, provided such prize money does not exceed his or her actual and necessary expenses for participation in the event.

Division I has always struggled with regulating the amateur activities of prospective student-athletes, who often don’t know the rules but who are equally likely to be attempting to manipulate them. No where is that no prevalent or more highly regulated than tennis. But in 2007, tennis almost went off the deep end of deregulation.

2007-23-A would have allowed for a tennis prospect to pocket $10,000 per year in prize money and then continue to accept prize money, provided it was only for actual and necessary expenses in each event. The rationale was that tennis is exceedingly expensive to play at the elite level, and the $10,000 per year often just covers unitemized expenses. Sponsored by the Ivy League, both 2007-23-A and an alternative allowing $10,000 total were both defeated.

#7: 2003-69

To eliminate the requirement that each Division I member institution, at least once every 10 years, complete an institutional self-study, verified and evaluated through external peer review.

Certification is built into the fabric of Division I athletics at this point. Every 10 years a school studies itself, submits itself to a peer review, evaluates its progress over the last decade, and offers a plan for growing over the next 10 years.

Following the first cycle of certification and as the second cycle ramped up, the Metro Atlantic Athletic Conference decided the exercise had reached its conclusion. Claiming second cycle certification had produced “few tangible benefits,” the MAAC proposed to do away with continued certification of athletic departments, and proposed ongoing review of topical areas conducted by conferences. After drawing a sharp rebuke from the Committee on Athletic Certification, the MAAC withdrew the proposal.

#6: 2005-162

To specify that an individual who officially registers, enrolls and attends classes at one of the three national service academy official preparatory schools (i.e., Army, Navy, Air Force) prior to initial full-time collegiate enrollment shall not be subject to the contact limitations in Bylaw 13 and shall be considered a student-athlete for purposes of contact by athletics staff members at other Division I institutions.

Proposed by the Patriot League, home of Navy and Army, 2005-162 would have essentially turned into student-athletes anyone who enrolled at one of the official military prep schools. That means recruiting restrictions would not have applied, and anyone from another school seeking to recruit this prospects would have had to get permission to contact these high schoolers.

The rationale was that the United States Military was already investing substantial resources in these prospects, and thus they should be treated like student-athletes. While our service academies get a number of breaks in the NCAA legislation, a de facto farm system went too far and was seen as too much of a competitive advantage. Thus it was defeated.

#5: 2009-28-A

In women’s soccer, to revise or establish restrictions related to contacts, telephone calls official and unofficial visits, offers of financial aid and involvement in nonscholastic-based soccer programs, as specified.

There has been a lot of talk of recruiting models and comprehensive recruiting reform. But no single proposal capture an entire recruiting model quite like 2009-28-A. “As specified” meant no contact prior to August 1 before a prospect’s senior year in high school. That meant no unofficial visits, no phone calls made or received, no off-campus contacts, and no club coaching by college coaches, although official visits were moved up to August 1, allowing them to be taken before school started for prospects.

Proposed by the SEC, the fear amongst the membership was that August 1 would be a feeding frenzy of coaches who would pressure student-athletes to make a decision quickly to fill a recruiting class they were used to being finished with up to two years prior. Both this proposal and a companion offered by the Ivy League proposing many of the same restrictions for all sports were both defeated.

#4: 2004-121

In men’s basketball, to specify that the head men’s coach must annually develop an individual personal growth plan with each student-athlete using community and institutional resources; further, to require the coach to periodically meet with each student-athlete to ensure that appropriate progress is being made toward the objectives set forth in the student-athlete’s personal growth plan.

Offered as part of a package developed by the NABC, this proposal would have required the creation of a mentioning plan between head coaches and student-athletes in men’s basketball. It’s a far cry from the NABC’s recent stance of deregulating most men’s basketball activities outside of money funneling.

The unanswered question is how this would ever be monitored. Sure, plans could be created and filed. And meetings could be scheduled and tracked. But how would you ever know if a student-athlete was progressing along his personal growth plan? Sadly we’ll never know. The proposal was defeated, resoundingly so, by a vote of 41-4.

#3: 2001-69

To specify that there shall be no simultaneous telecasting or cablecasting of regular season intercollegiate football games on Friday nights.

There’s college football televised on almost every night. But back in 2001, the Atlantic Coast Conference proposed leaving Friday Night Lights for high school only. There was one catch though: a Friday game could be broadcast live if it finished by 7:00 PM everywhere it was broadcast. So had the ACC not withdrawn the proposal after it was introduced, perhaps college might have seen the Friday Night Dusk.

#2: 2002-97, 2006-86

To establish an NCAA Division I Nonscholarship Football Championship.

Twice since 2000, the Football Championship Subdivision teams that do not provide scholarships have asked for the NCAA’s assistance in creating their own national championship. Conference of nonscholarship FCS schools are not eligible for automatic bids and the individual schools are rarely, if ever, selected as at-large participants. On two separate occasions, the schools have tried to carve out their own unique niche.

2002-97 was to create an official NCAA championship for Division I FCS (I-AA at the time) nonscholaship football. 2006-96 asked to allow schools to exempt the games in a non-NCAA championship event for nonscholarship football programs. As the calls for a major college playoff get louder and louder, we almost had two Division I playoffs without including the big boys.

#1: 2000-103

To permit a student-athlete to obtain a loan (not to exceed $20,000) based on future earnings potential from a centralized lending institution, as specified.

First the particulars: it wasn’t all student-athletes. Only student-athletes that had qualified for the NCAA’s disability insurance for elite student-athletes. Currently, that would apply to student-athletes who are projected to be drafted in the first round of the NBA, MLB, or WNBA Draft or first three rounds of the NFL or NHL Draft. And it wasn’t a loan from just anyone but from a real bank.

The Academics/Eligibility/Compliance Cabinet sponsored the proposal through the Management Council, the predecessor to the Legislative Council. The Board of Directors did not yet have authority to sponsor legislation, so 2000-103 came from as close to the top as it could back then.

And the proposal was never actually defeated in an up and down vote. It was tabled and forgotten until 2008 when the shift to the current governance structure finally killed the proposal. It may not be paying athletes exactly, but it’s the most surprising rule that could have been from the last 10 years.

The opinions expressed on this blog are the author’s and the author’s alone, and are not endorsed by the NCAA or any NCAA member institution or conference. This blog is not a substitute for a compliance office.

About John Infante

The opinions expressed on this blog are the author’s and the author’s alone, and are not endorsed by the NCAA or any NCAA member institution or conference. This blog is not a substitute for a compliance office. If you’re a coach, do not attempt to contact the author looking for a second opinion. If you’re a parent, don’t attempt to contact the author looking for a first opinion. Compliance professionals are by their nature helpful people generally dedicated to getting to the truth. Coaches should have a bit of faith in their own, and parents should talk to one directly.

Filed Under: Bylaw Blog Tagged With: , , , , , , , ,

The Deal

March 18, 2011 by

At its heart, the NCAA is a voluntary enterprise. Schools voluntary decide to join it and select their level of competition and regulation. Coaches and administrators choose to be employed by NCAA institutions, with all the restrictions and benefits that designation entails. Athletes choose to become student-athletes. When an athlete decides to become a student-athlete, they enter into a bargain.

That bargain provides athletes with assistance in paying for a college education, training and development in the sport of their choosing, and in some sports the exposure that can be vital in beginning a career as a professional athlete. In return, the student-athlete agrees to forego profiting off his or her athletic ability while they are a student-athlete and agrees to reach certain academic benchmarks. This is the deal offered to student-athletes.

There are plenty of potential criticisms of this bargain. You may not believe enough financial assistance is guaranteed. You may not believe the training and development is sufficient. And you may not feel like student-athletes have enough information to enter into this bargain or leave it at the proper time.

The fact is that for two sports, this bargain is only technically a bargain. College athletics is neither slavery nor indentured servitude. All student-athletes is free to walk away at any time if they feel exploited or are offered a better deal. But when an option is your only option, what is technically a voluntary bargain becomes one you are compelled to accept.

In some sports, baseball for instance, the bargain is a truly voluntary one. A prospective student-athlete is free under NCAA and MLB rules to be drafted and negotiate a contract (yes, we can argue about the agent/advisor distinction). At some point, the prospect has a final offer with a deadline from a professional team and a scholarship offer from an NCAA institution. He then can decide which one is in his best interest to accept. Similar scenarios play out in hockey and soccer every year.

But in football and basketball, those alternatives do not exist. A senior in high school has no clear alternative to agreeing to at least one or three years of NCAA amateurism. As a result, those years of restrictions on earnings and required coursework are essentially forced upon someone who would not have agreed to it if an alternative existed.

The onus then in put on the NCAA to improve the deal it offers to student-athletes. And not just at the margins in terms of multi-year scholarships or better training. Rather, the NCAA membership is pressured to change the fundamentals of the agreement by eliminating the restrictions on profiting from one’s athletic ability and/or reducing or eliminating the academic requirements.

But it was not the NCAA who made the current deal offered to student-athletes the only one available. It was the NFL and NBA who took advantage of the fact that the NCAA operates the only 18-23 year old developmental league at zero cost to the professional league it feeds athletes into in the world. If Division I athletics were not played at the level they are, it would be both unconscionable and unprofitable to both bar high schoolers from entering the professional ranks and refuse to operate a minor league focused on development.

When Brigham Young University suspended Brandon Davies for a violation of the university’s Honor Code, we were reassured that every student at BYU knows what they are signing up for. To the extent that we as NCAA members have failed to make it clear to prospective student-athletes what they are signing up for, then we can justly be criticized.

Because NCAA amateurism has an educational, if not a moral component. It preaches delayed gratification. It encourages student-athletes to use fleeting athletic talent to secure a college education, something with a much greater shelf life. And it exposes student-athletes to a range of experiences and opinions they are unlikely to encounter if they jump straight to the professional ranks.

But no one should be forced into those experiences. If a student-athlete does not want to be bound by the BYU Honor Code, there are 345 other Division I institutions that have different rules. Prospective student-athletes don’t need 345 different options when deciding how to continue their athletic career. They just need at least two. The NCAA is offering one. It’s time that the NFL and NBA offer a second.

The opinions expressed on this blog are the author’s and the author’s alone, and are not endorsed by the NCAA or any NCAA member institution or conference. This blog is not a substitute for a compliance office.

About John Infante

The opinions expressed on this blog are the author’s and the author’s alone, and are not endorsed by the NCAA or any NCAA member institution or conference. This blog is not a substitute for a compliance office. If you’re a coach, do not attempt to contact the author looking for a second opinion. If you’re a parent, don’t attempt to contact the author looking for a first opinion. Compliance professionals are by their nature helpful people generally dedicated to getting to the truth. Coaches should have a bit of faith in their own, and parents should talk to one directly.

Filed Under: Bylaw Blog, Feature Tagged With: , , ,

Draft Rules Fail Basics of Amateurism

February 17, 2011 by

Two things that happened over the past month have been dismissed as something of throwaway lines, but should have gotten more attention. First was the term coined or at least restated by NCAA President Mark Emmert that student-athletes are “pre-professionals.” Second was Southern California athletics director Pat Haden encouraging schools to recognize and even embrace the professional aspirations of their student-athletes:

“The discussion was, ‘Hey, we’re kidding ourselves if we don’t believe in our heart that every one of these guys wants to go to the NFL or NBA,’ ” Haden said. “I have been one that often starts with a negative, to say, ‘Hey, your odds of going to the NFL are remote.’

“That’s not what they want to hear. If they’re going to trust us … we’re going to have to think how they think.”

It’s not the complete 180-degree turn to professional student-athletes that many find the only fair system of intercollegiate athletics. But it shouldn’t be downplayed that the president of the NCAA is using the word “professional” in any way to describe student-athletes, prefixes or not. Meanwhile, faced with the most difficult environment for operating anything amateur in the country, USC’s Haden figured out carrots can be used, in addition to the normal sticks.

Focusing on the small fraction of the 400,000 student-athletes that will go pro in sports puts the NCAA’s mission in somewhat different light. While it seems hypocritical for President Emmert to call student-athletes pre-professionals then repeat his loathing of the idea of paying student-athletes, the two ideas can be reconciled quite easily. There are a group of student-athletes who will become professional athletes. But not yet. The NCAA’s educational mission is fulfilled by preparing them to make this transition. But the NCAA’s amateur nature prevents the preparation from including schools providing a salary to student-athletes.

As an aside, Emmert’s “not on my watch” stance against paying student-athletes is as much a statement of personal philosophy as it is recognition of inescapable fact. If the NCAA is a professional sports organization, the Association will have changed a great deal. It’s unlikely that organization will still be led by someone whose primary experience is in higher education administration.

The goal then is not to professionalize student-athletes, but to prepare them to become professionals. An essential part of preparing student-athletes (or students for that matter) to become professionals is to provide them with a way out of college into professional life. This is one area that needs attention by the NCAA membership.

The NCAA’s amateurism rules are about choice. Whenever a regulation is added to Bylaw 12 that makes it an amateurism violation to do something, a question must be asked. Is the activity good enough evidence that an amateur athlete is deciding to give up their amateur status? Until the NCAA makes widespread use of foolproof polygraph tests (unlikely in the foreseeable future), documentable facts need to drive the determination of who is and isn’t an amateur.

This theory has long underpinned Bylaw 12.2.4.2:

Bylaw 12.2.4.2 – Draft List.
After initial full-time collegiate enrollment, an individual loses amateur status in a particular sport when the individual asks to be placed on the draft list or supplemental draft list of a professional league in that sport, even though: (Revised: 4/25/02 effective 8/1/02)

  1. The individual asks that his or her name be withdrawn from the draft list prior to the actual draft;
  2. The individual’s name remains on the list but he or she is not drafted; or
  3. The individual is drafted but does not sign an agreement with any professional athletics team.

Bylaw 12.2.4.2 is then softened through a number of exceptions that essentially allow a student-athlete to enter a draft once during their career, so long as they remove themselves shortly thereafter.

It’s the word “asks” that creates many of the problems with the NCAA’s approach to professional drafts. The NBA and NFL require student-athletes with eligibility remaining to declare for the draft. This arises partially from the origins of underclassmen entering the NBA draft, when they had to demonstrate “hardship” to the league office.

Major League Baseball on the other hand doesn’t require that you “ask” to be in the draft. If you meet MLB’s draft eligibility rules, you are available for selection. The fact that being drafted by an MLB team is not an amateurism violation makes sense. Otherwise MLB teams could ruin the amateur status of student-athletes without any action by the student-athlete.

It’s what happens next in baseball that creates problems. After being drafted, student-athletes attempt to negotiate a professional contract. They often hire professional advisors to assist in this process. These advisors are almost always agents acting in an advising capacity, with fee structures identical to player representation agreements.

Major League Soccer further breaks the logic by flipping the draft and the negotiation in the league’s single-entity structure. Underclassmen first attempt to negotiate a contract, and if successful they are entered into the available player pool in the MLS SuperDraft.

To summarize, it is a violation to go through a draft if you decided you want to be in it. But it isn’t a violation in some cases if you are drafted and then attempt to negotiate the greatest possible compensation for your athletic skills. And it isn’t a violation to attempt that negotiation in order to enter the draft.

The fact that this is unfair to some student-athletes is secondary. Most important is that entering a professional draft is not sufficient evidence that you want to give up your collegiate eligibility. Entering a draft and deciding any contract offered would not be worth leaving college is no more or less an indication of a student-athlete’s intent to professionalize themselves than deciding a contract offer is not sufficient to leave college and enter the draft in the first place.

In essence, the draft rules are not performing the function that every amateurism rule must perform. They are not giving us good enough evidence that a student-athlete has decided to give up their eligibility. Drafts should be treated as the logical conclusion of inquiring about a student-athlete’s market value, a process permitted by Bylaw 12.2.4.1.

Arguments against the NCAA’s draft rules and efforts to strengthen them like Proposal 2010-24 center around making sure that student-athletes have sufficient information to decide when to drop the “pre” from “pre-professional.” And that’s a valid and important concern. But more important is ensuring that student-athletes know what actions will cause them to lose their amateur status and ensuring that those actions are well-grounded in basic NCAA principles.

The opinions expressed on this blog are the author’s and the author’s alone, and are not endorsed by the NCAA or any NCAA member institution or conference. This blog is not a substitute for a compliance office.

About John Infante

The opinions expressed on this blog are the author’s and the author’s alone, and are not endorsed by the NCAA or any NCAA member institution or conference. This blog is not a substitute for a compliance office. If you’re a coach, do not attempt to contact the author looking for a second opinion. If you’re a parent, don’t attempt to contact the author looking for a first opinion. Compliance professionals are by their nature helpful people generally dedicated to getting to the truth. Coaches should have a bit of faith in their own, and parents should talk to one directly.

Filed Under: Bylaw Blog, Feature Tagged With: ,

What Would Paying Student-Athletes Look Like?

January 19, 2011 by

One of the troubles with the debate over whether college athletes should be paid is that both sides have a moving target. Proponents of NCAA amateurism have many arguments to throw at the idea of paid college athletes, from the dynamic between coach and athlete to the impact on education to the unique appeal college athletics has as elite amateur competition (the old “I hate the pros, bunch of overpaid divas!” complaint). Proponents of professional college athletics have any number of different ideas, from monthly stipends to allowing outside compensation to bona fide professional contracts.

As a result, you’ve rarely seen a debate between the status quo and one definitive alternative. That makes it too easy for proponents of pay-for-play to change the alternative to fit the argument and for proponents of amateurism to change the argument to attack the alternative. The result is that the debate never serves its core function: to force a continual reassessment of the fundamental fairness of the grant-in-aid.

Let’s assume major college football has broken away from the NCAA to form their own league. Football is the example here for a number of reasons. No developmental league exists here or abroad. Removing football from the NCAA has little immediate impact on how college sports are administered, and if anything would improve the situation. The NCAA membership, as a whole, has less at stake in FBS football because of the lack of an NCAA championship.

Let’s also assume that this league keeps the rest of the NCAA rulebook largely intact. Meaning no booster payments, no agreements with agents, all academic eligibility requirements, practice limits, etc.

Payment would not be small monthly stipends. The idea that pocket money solves all the problems is disproven by last summer’s agent cases. $1,000 watches, trips to South Beach, and expensive personal training on the other side of the country are all things elite student-athletes want. They’re also all things that cannot be funded on a couple hundred dollars a month.

It would also not be major league contracts. By that I mean player compensation would likely not vary widely, and would not be tied to a percentage of revenue. This is for a couple reasons. First, a college football league is going to fight hard to keep the parity that exists due to the NCAA’s standard grant-in-aid amount. Second, this would be very a much a minor league and minor leagues tend to have much more standardized player contracts than major leagues.

So what would it look like? Inspiration comes from two sources: the minor league baseball contract and Generation adidas.

The minor league baseball contract is a standard contract that has one major part that changes: the size of the signing bonus. For the first contract season, the salary is capped at $1,100 in the most recent CBA. The slotting system and negotiation is based around the signing bonus.

In Major League Soccer’s Generation adidas program, early entry candidates (high school or college athletes who have not exhausted their eligibility) sign a contract that includes money held in escrow for educational expenses that they have 10 years to use.

So what are the elements of a contract that this league might use?

  • A base salary that covers basic room and board expenses. Let’s use $1,250 per month, which works out to a nice round $15,000 per year and represents a little above the highest room and board allowances.
  • Payment of all tuition, fees, and book costs associated with attending the university during the athlete’s collegiate career, since these would still be student-athletes. Call it an average of $20,000 per year. This money would be guaranteed upon the signing of the contract though at least six years.
  • A signing bonus up to $100,000 or $25,000 annually for a four-year career

That creates a system where the lowest paid players are getting essentially the same deal they are now: a full grant-in-aid that covers tuition, fees, room, board, and books. The highest paid players are getting total compensation of roughly $60,000 per year, but a third of their compensation is earmarked for education. $40,000 a year represents a decent living wage, and much of that money comes up front, which can provide assistance to needy athletes. Stay smart about how you spend your money, and it could provide for a few of the finer things as well.

So to proponents of paying college athletes, focus on this proposal. It’s a sensible proposal for paying college athletes that is based on professional developmental contracts. If you run the league right, it may even be a wash in costs for many football programs (although that’s beyond the score of this post).

And to the proponents of NCAA amateurism, this is the proposal that should be argued against. Stipends and major league contracts are too easy to argue against. It represents both the biggest challenge to NCAA amateurism, as well as the best yardstick for judging the fairness of the grant-in-aid and working toward improving financial assistance for student-athletes while still adhering to NCAA principles.

The opinions expressed on this blog are the author’s and the author’s alone, and are not endorsed by the NCAA or any NCAA member institution or conference. This blog is not a substitute for a compliance office.

About John Infante

The opinions expressed on this blog are the author’s and the author’s alone, and are not endorsed by the NCAA or any NCAA member institution or conference. This blog is not a substitute for a compliance office. If you’re a coach, do not attempt to contact the author looking for a second opinion. If you’re a parent, don’t attempt to contact the author looking for a first opinion. Compliance professionals are by their nature helpful people generally dedicated to getting to the truth. Coaches should have a bit of faith in their own, and parents should talk to one directly.

Filed Under: Bylaw Blog, Feature Tagged With: , ,

The Delicate Balance of Amateurism and Education

November 10, 2010 by

Both Jay Bilas in his call for the NCAA to reform itself (subscription req’d) and John Gasaway in his article on amateurism in the NCAA (purchase req’d) argue for the same thing. Ignore all the fluff in the two articles. At the core, the two pieces argue the same three points.

  1. The NCAA’s view of amateurism is based on a historical ideal with elitist roots.
  2. The place in the world for the NCAA’s version of amateurism has been under attack if not gone from the moment the NCAA was formed.
  3. Allowing student-athletes to receive compensation from third parties and have agreements with agents would not further damage the NCAA’s amateur principles.

The first point is at the very least useful for the NCAA and its member institutions to keep in mind. However, the fact that the world that existed when the principle was created was much different from the world that exists now is not sufficient reason to throw away the principle. I disagree with Gasaway’s characterization of amateurism as a simple state of being though. To me the NCAA promoting their version of amateurism is no different than the Salvation Army promoting their version of generosity. The issue is whether you agree with the mission of the organization promoting the virtue.

The second point in both article ignores an important caveat. It’s legitimate to question whether the NCAA’s view of amateurism holds water … in a world where the NCAA is the de facto final developmental step for two major professional sports leagues. Or worse, it assumes that the NCAA desires or created that condition. I would agree however that some of the NCAA rules, much like the critics of those same rules, don’t seem to take into account that very important fact.

I have a great deal of disagreement with the third point, the solution that Bilas and Gasaway both propose. Part of that comes from the fact that the argument assumes that the NCAA should not be an idealistic organization. In fact, it would be the height of hypocrisy if the NCAA, a non-profit entity, was not striving for some version of a better tomorrow, whether you agree with it or not.

This is where Bilas’s version of the argument runs off the rails. If the NCAA’s principles are “intellectually dishonest” and “fairy tales,” then why does Bilas present what purports to be a passionate defense of the organization? If one of the chief means of promoting and enforcing those principles is “profoundly immoral,” why does the Association deserve to be rescued from the brink? And how is the NCAA saved at all by eliminating or drastically changing one of its core principles?

If a critic of the NCAA believes the organization has outlived its usefulness, then they should argue for the abolishment of the NCAA. Because while arguing for reform of this degree sounds like preservation, if the NCAA adopted such a reform, it wouldn’t be the NCAA anymore. Sure, the letterhead might say “National Collegiate Athletic Association,” but the substance of that organization would be something totally different.

The two core principles of the NCAA, amateurism and education, also cannot be divorced from each other. Amateurism helps allow for education and education is the reward offered for choosing amateurism. That’s where Gasaway’s idea of “doubling down” on academics, namely requiring increased academic standards in exchange for deregulating agent agreement and benefits misses the mark.

It’s not that allowing agents and outside compensation just ruins the amateurism ideal. Whether student-athletes are truly amateurs still is a point on which reasonable people can differ. The same goes for a debate about the degree to which welcoming third parties into the structure of the NCAA would further damage efforts to promote the amateur ideal.

It’s that allowing, even legitimizing third parties who seek to make a quick buck by getting an athlete to leave school early, the ability of the NCAA and its member institutions to promote a college education is also harmed. And while paternalistic arguments are tougher to defend, its important to note that many times the student-athlete leaving based on the advice of those people is to their detriment.

The NCAA has a principle regarding education, just like it has a principle regarding amateurism:

Bylaw 2.2.1 – Overall Educational Experience.
It is the responsibility of each member institution to establish and maintain an environment in which a student-athlete’s activities are conducted as an integral part of the student-athlete’s educational experience. (Adopted: 1/10/95)

Over all those principles hangs the general principle of the Association:

Bylaw 2.01 – General Principle
Legislation enacted by the Association governing the conduct of intercollegiate athletics shall be designed to advance one or more basic principles, including the following, to which the members are committed. In some instances, a delicate balance of these principles is necessary to help achieve the objectives of the Association.

Just as you can’t separate amateurism from education, you can’t separate education from amateurism. Total deregulation of agents and outside compensation is not a tweak, it is a major philosophical change. And even if that deregulation promoted amateurism, it is anything but delicate. But just as Bilas and Gasaway pointed out that the NCAA’s vision of amateurism has its roots in the early 20th century, so too does the NCAA’s vision of education.

Back in that time, a postsecondary education was for the learned professions and the sciences. Undergraduate education was still firmly rooted in the liberal arts, and was a very elitist institution. It was not until the middle of the 20th century that college shifted toward what it is today, where it’s a virtual requirement for most white-collar professions and there is a struggle to provide access to college for as many people as possible.

The rules could be updated to address this change by expressly allowing, even promoting two majors: sport performance and sport education (i.e. coaching).

Such a move would reinforce the idea that college should prepare you for a professional career. It would acknowledge the idea that professional athletics is a viable career, even if only for a minuscule portion of the student-athlete population. The relatively small number of graduates making a living as full-time artists, musicians, or philosophers has not killed off those majors.

It would also promote the idea that the study of athletic performance is a meaningful academic endeavor, just as the study of musical or artistic performance is. That would open an avenue for increased study of issues like concussions and overtraining. And it would provide a new source of professionally trained coaches, particularly needed as specialization, injuries, and money continue to grow at the youth level.

Courses in a sport performance major could include the type of education that elite athletes have needed, such as courses on personal investing and accounting, public relations, and media training. Schools that already have or choose to develop a sports management program could teach student-athletes the business of the professional leagues they are entering. Not to mention some sort of credit for practicing and playing the student-athlete’s sport. The coaching major would be similar, but with more education mixed in.

There would be a host of details to be worked out, from how classes fit into practice limits and whether funneling of students to such majors needs to be watched to how coaches fit into the faculty structure of a university and who accredits these programs. It’s a move for the small minority of student-athletes who will be going pro in sports, in some fashion. But it even as it clearly stakes out territory for the NCAA and its member institutions in preparing students for professional athletics, it also ties the athletic department closer to the university and potentially increases faculty control of athletic department spending and policies.

Preparing student-athletes to make a living playing their sport or teaching it to others reinforces the principle of education to help train athletes for a potential professional career or to help them use their athletic skill in a related field. It assists amateurism by striking a better bargain for athletes and providing a place for the individualized instruction necessary to help athletes make good decisions about their professional careers. And it does a better job striking that delicate balance than simply throwing the doors open to anyone who wants in.

The opinions expressed on this blog are the author’s and the author’s alone, and are not endorsed by the NCAA or any NCAA member institution or conference. This blog is not a substitute for a compliance office.

About John Infante

The opinions expressed on this blog are the author’s and the author’s alone, and are not endorsed by the NCAA or any NCAA member institution or conference. This blog is not a substitute for a compliance office. If you’re a coach, do not attempt to contact the author looking for a second opinion. If you’re a parent, don’t attempt to contact the author looking for a first opinion. Compliance professionals are by their nature helpful people generally dedicated to getting to the truth. Coaches should have a bit of faith in their own, and parents should talk to one directly.

Filed Under: Bylaw Blog, Feature Tagged With: , ,

NCAA Foreign Policy Helps Domestic Issues

November 4, 2010 by

The opinions expressed on this blog are the author’s and the author’s alone, and are not endorsed by the NCAA or any NCAA member institution or conference. This blog is not a substitute for a compliance office. If you’re a coach, do not attempt to contact the author looking for a second opinion. If you’re a parent, don’t attempt to contact the author looking for a first opinion. Compliance professionals are by their nature helpful people generally dedicated to getting to the truth. Coaches should have a bit of faith in their own, and parents should talk to one directly.

When the NCAA membership enacted Proposal 2009-22 last year, the reactions to the proposal sounded like responses to a new advertising initiative. The move was seen as the NCAA opening new markets for international recruiting particularly European basketball prospects.

That opinion misses the mark on two small fronts and one big front. First, international prospects generally and European basketball prospects specifically had been enrolling and competing for Division I institutions for years. The proposal just allows a broader range of prospective student-athletes to compete in Division I without penalty. Second, solving some of the issues 2009-22 addresses could have been accomplished with a smaller legislative change or changes by the Committee on Student-Athlete Reinstatement to the guidelines for reinstating these prospects.

The bigger error is that Proposal 2009-22 did not start international recruiting, rather it exists because of the growing success of international recruiting. If NCAA institutions were not successfully recruiting international prospects, clubs would not have begun moving athletes around different levels of the organization (i.e. youth players up to the professional team or professional players down to the youth team) for the purpose of jeopardizing the eligibility of their youth players.

While the idea of teams moving athletes around to keep them out of college seems like something that could never happen in the United States, it was relatively close to happening in at least one sport.

In 2007, the United States Soccer Federation launched the Development Academy system. Designed to combat a lack of skill development and training in the existing structure of club soccer, the USSF created a system where elite young athletes get more practice and repetitions, along with fewer games against higher quality opposition.

The MLS bought into the idea wholesale, requiring teams to field youth teams. Every American franchise now fields teams in the Academy, while Toronto FC fields teams in the Canadian Soccer League. The youth teams are generally free or have minimal fees, and employ full-time coaches.

The movement began to reach its logical conclusion this summer when Real Salt Lake launched the first residential academy in Casa Grande, AZ. Ultimately housing 80 players, RSL’s academy is akin to youth teams around the world where young players live, train, and sometimes attend class while training to see if they can break into the senior professional team. And Proposal 2009-22 helped make this possible:

Prior to RSL’s landmark academy, IMG has run a residential program in Bradenton, Florida, which supports the U-17 U.S. National Team, but until this summer NCAA regulations restricted young athletes from most interactions with the professional game. With those recent changes allowing young players to compete and train with professionals without losing amateur status, MLS clubs are able to more closely develop U.S. players according to worldwide standards while still preparing them for the college.

The MLS watched the NCAA’s deregulation of competition with professional teams carefully, and it was not until this summer that the MLS allowed athletes to move between the Academy and senior teams. Still, it’s hard to imagine that the MLS would have held off creating a youth development structure simply because it did not fit with the NCAA’s regulations. Had Proposal 2009-22 not passed, there eventually would have been a competition for top prospects between the systems that would develop them for college (high school, club, and non-MLS Academy teams) and the MLS Academies, which would develop them for professional athletics and potentially jeopardize their eligibility.

One question now could be how the effects of 2009-22 and the rise of youth teams attached to professional clubs in the United States could help other areas. Is there a place for USA Basketball and the NBA to work together to create a more controlled, top-down development system as an alternative to the bottom-up structure of grassroots basketball? There would be a number of issues, such as how to reward clubs for developing players, how the clubs interact with the NBA’s age limit, where a USA Basketball/NBA developmental league might fit in the men’s basketball recruiting calendar, not to mention who pays for all this. But none of these are insurmountable problems.

Proposal 2009-22 was intended to solve international problems. But it solved at least one impending domestic issue that threatened to kill off a collegiate sport. And it provides new tools the NCAA, national governing bodies, professional sports leagues, and existing youth development programs can use to work together to solve issues in the current recruiting and development environment. That could be where 2009-22 makes the greatest impact.

About John Infante

The opinions expressed on this blog are the author’s and the author’s alone, and are not endorsed by the NCAA or any NCAA member institution or conference. This blog is not a substitute for a compliance office. If you’re a coach, do not attempt to contact the author looking for a second opinion. If you’re a parent, don’t attempt to contact the author looking for a first opinion. Compliance professionals are by their nature helpful people generally dedicated to getting to the truth. Coaches should have a bit of faith in their own, and parents should talk to one directly.

Filed Under: Bylaw Blog, Feature Tagged With: ,

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